講座題目：Misreporting Demand Information 2019-12-16

講座題目： Misreporting Demand Information

報告人：香港城市大學(xué)商學(xué)院 李曦助理教授

時 間：  2019年12月23日（周一）下午2點30分

地 點：  bwin必贏唯一官網(wǎng)313會議室

內(nèi)容簡介：

 In this study, we investigate information sharing in a distribution channel in which the retailer possesses superior information about market demand. Departing from the existing literature on information sharing which assumes that information sharing must be truthful, we allow the retailer to manipulate and misreport its demand information for its benefit at an information manipulation cost. We find that the retailer's ability to manipulate information has substantial effects on the equilibrium outcome: when the cost of manipulation is low, the retailer cannot help but to deflate its demand forecast (even if the actual demand is high) to convince the manufacturer to offer it a low wholesale price. When the cost of manipulation is moderate, the retailer, in the case of high demand, randomizes between misreporting and truthful reporting. Finally, when the cost of manipulation is high, the retailer never misreports its demand information. While the manufacturer's profit increases with the manipulation cost, the retailer's profit is nonmonotone with this cost. At first, it decreases but only up to a certain point, after which the effect is reversed. Within a certain parameter space, the retailer's ability to manipulate information hurts both the manufacturer's and retailer's profits, thereby creating a lose-lose situation. Collectively, these results underscore the significant effects of information manipulation in distribution channel management.

學(xué)者簡介：

李曦，香港城市大學(xué)商學(xué)院市場營銷系助理教授。于加拿大多倫多大學(xué)，香港科技大學(xué)，清華大學(xué)分別獲得市場營銷學(xué)博士，運營管理碩士，計算機科學(xué)學(xué)士學(xué)位。目前主要從事運營管理與營銷學(xué)，經(jīng)濟學(xué)等交叉學(xué)科方向研究。迄今為止，以第一作者或獨立作者在多個國際頂級（UTD 24）以及一流學(xué)術(shù)期刊，如Marketing Science, Journal of Marketing Research, and International Journal of Research in Marketing發(fā)表多篇學(xué)術(shù)成果。

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